Misreading the Nordic Model, How American Admirers Get Scandinavia Wrong
Misreading
the Nordic Model, How American Admirers Get Scandinavia Wrong
By Nima Sanandaji
Taken From:Foreign Affairs
Bernie Sanders,
the left-wing populist who for months competed with Hillary Clinton in the
Democratic primary, has popularized a simple vision for reform: introduce a
Nordic-style welfare state in the United States. In a debate with Clinton,
Sanders explained that his aim is to popularize the concept of Scandinavian
democratic socialism: “I think we should look to countries like Denmark, like
Sweden and Norway, and learn what they have accomplished for their working
people.”
Sanders and his
supporters are not alone in praising the Nordic model. In 2013, President
Barack Obama followed suit by making the first bilateral visit by a U.S.
president to Sweden, complimenting his hosts about their country’s economic
model. He escalated the praise at a U.S.-Nordic summit in May 2016, where he
explained: "In a world of growing economic disparities, Nordic countries
have some of the least income inequality in the world—which may explain one of
the reasons that they're some of the happiest people in the world, despite not
getting much sun. . . . There have been times where I’ve said, why don’t we
just put all these small countries in charge for a while? And they could clean
things up."
Admiration for the
Nordic welfare state runs deep among U.S. academics, journalists, and
politicians on the left. It’s easy to understand why—at first glance, the
Nordic countries appear prosperous yet enjoy equal distribution of wealth and
good social outcomes. A closer look, however, shows that what American liberals
like about Nordic societies is not a product of socialism. The success of
Nordic countries has more to do with their unique culture—and free markets—than
with their welfare state policies.
NORDIC CAPITALISM
A 2015 story by
PBS titled “What Can the U.S. Learn from Denmark?” is a good example of how
many Americans view Scandinavia. The article heaps praise on the Danish social
model, explaining that “Danes get free or heavily subsidized health care” and
“compensation when they’re unemployed, out sick from work, or on parental
leave.” It notes Denmark’s high taxes, strong labor unions, and heavy state
involvement in the economy. It suggests that these policies explain why Danes
live, on average, 1.5 years longer than Americans.
All these
statements are of course true, but they lack historical perspective. Danes
today outlive their American counterparts, but not because Denmark has the
highest tax-to-GDP ratio in the developed world. As late as 1960, taxes in
Denmark were actually lower than in the United States (25 percent of GDP
compared with 27 percent), yet at the time, Danes lived 2.4 years longer than
Americans—well before the creation of the Danish welfare state. In Sweden and Norway,
too, the gap in life span compared with the United States is smaller today than
it was in the mid–twentieth century, when their public sectors were relatively
less developed. Child mortality follows a similar trend: when Nordic countries
had small welfare states, they were further ahead compared with the rest of the
world than they are today.
The positive
influence of the welfare state on overall prosperity is similarly exaggerated.
In fact, prosperity in the Nordic countries has increased faster in periods of
economic freedom than in those of democratic socialism. The example of Sweden
is instructive. In the latter half of the nineteenth century, liberal
politicians such as Johan August Gripenstedt, minister of finance from 1856 to
1866, introduced reforms designed to secure business freedom, free trade, and
strong protections for property rights. From around 1870 to 1936, Sweden
pursued pro-market economic policies and was rewarded with an average yearly
growth rate of two percent—the highest of any western European nation during
the period and twice as high as rates of leading economies such as that of the
United Kingdom.
In 1936, the
Swedish Social Democratic Party was able to form its first majority government.
The Social Democrats went on to dominate Swedish political life until 1970,
slowly raising taxes and expanding the welfare state while, for the most part,
leaving the market-oriented policies of their predecessors in place. During
these years, Sweden’s growth rate rose to 2.9 percent. Although higher in
absolute terms than before—a product of technological growth and the postwar
boom—this was around the western European average. (Austria, for instance, grew
by a yearly average of 3.5 percent over the same period.)
Then, between 1970
and 1991, Sweden—unlike other Nordic countries—experimented with third way
socialism. The pinnacle of these policies was the introduction of “employer
funds,” a system through which ownership of private firms would slowly be
transferred to funds run by the labor unions. Sweden’s average growth rate fell
to 1.4 percent, the second lowest in western Europe, and many successful
businesses and individuals left the country. The socialist experiment was
followed by an era of renewed focus on market reforms, reduced generosity of
welfare programs, and significant tax reductions. The reforms paid off: between
1991 and 2014, Sweden’s growth rate rose to 1.8 percent—placing the country
only slightly behind the United Kingdom, which had the highest rate in western
Europe during this period.
CULTURE SHOCK
In addition to
economic growth, American admirers of the Nordic societies often focus on their
social attributes, such as high levels of income and wealth equality. Yet as I
show in my book, many of these attributes largely predate the welfare state.
For instance, in a 2008 study of top incomes in Sweden, the economists Jesper
Roine and Daniel Waldenstrom explain that “most of the decrease [in income
equality in Sweden] takes place before the expansion of the welfare state and
by 1950 Swedish top income shares were already lower than in other countries.”
A 2013 study by Anthony Barnes Atkinson and Jakob Egholt Sogaard reached a
similar conclusion for Denmark and Norway. As my brother, the economist Tino
Sanandaji, explains in another paper from 2012: “American scholars who write
about the success of the Scandinavian welfare states in the postwar period tend
to be remarkably uninterested in Scandinavia’s history prior to that period.
Scandinavia was likely the most egalitarian part of Europe even before the
modern era. For example, it was the only major part of Western Europe that
never developed full-scale feudalism and never reduced its farmers to serfdom.”
Good social
outcomes in the Nordic countries predate the welfare state because what makes
Nordic societies unique is related not to policy—large welfare states can also
be found in countries such as Belgium, France, and Spain—but to culture. Over
100 years ago, German sociologist Max Weber observed that Protestant countries
in northern Europe tended to have higher living standards, better academic
institutions, and more well-functioning societies than countries in other parts
of Europe. He attributed their success to the “Protestant work ethic.” Swedish
scholar Assar Lindbeck later built upon this theory by looking at factors other
than religion. For instance, he explained that in the hostile environment of
preindustrial Scandinavia, it was difficult to survive as a farmer without
working exceptionally hard. The population therefore adopted out of necessity a
culture with a great emphasis on individual responsibility, honesty, trust,
punctuality, and hard work.
These cultural
attributes help explain why Nordic nations developed high levels of prosperity
and low levels of poverty during the small-government era of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The welfare states were introduced
only once Nordic societies had already become prosperous and equal. Everything
that Bernie Sanders, Barack Obama, and other leading Democrats admire about
Nordic countries already existed in the middle of the twentieth century, when
these societies had small public sectors and low taxes. In fact, these outcomes
can be found in the United States, too, among a specific group of people:
Americans with Nordic ancestry.
It is instructive
to compare citizens of the Nordics with Nordic Americans. Historically,
impoverished people in the Nordic countries were more likely than the rich to
sail across the Atlantic to start new lives. Yet despite coming from the
poorest rungs of Nordic society, Nordic Americans have become much more
affluent than their cousins back in Europe. Today, measured by GDP per capita,
Danish Americans’ living standards are 55 percent higher than those of Danes;
living standards of Swedish Americans are 53 percent higher than those of
Swedes; and Finnish Americans’ living standards are 59 percent higher than the
Finns’. Even for Norwegian Americans, who lack the oil wealth of Norway, living
standards outpace those of the Norwegians by three percent.
Nordic Americans
are also more socially successful than their cousins in the Nordic countries.
They have much lower high school dropout rates, much lower unemployment rates,
and even slightly lower poverty rates. Their success cannot be a result of the
Nordic welfare state. Rather, Nordic Americans rely on the same culture of
success that has enabled social progress in their countries of origin.
NO MAGIC FORMULA
The simple truth
is that there is nothing magical about the Nordics. Like other countries, they
have thrived economically in periods of free market reforms and have stagnated
when taxes and government involvement in the economy have increased. Their
social success predates the welfare state and is no more or less impressive
than the social success of Nordic Americans. And as I show in Debunking Utopia,
norms related to hard work and individual responsibility, which developed
before the welfare state, have begun to change since it was introduced.
In recent years, a
number of Nordic economists have linked the Nordic welfare state to evolving
norms around work. The Danish economist Casper Hunnerup Dahl, for instance, has
argued that there is a strong correlation between the expansion of Denmark’s
welfare programs and a decrease in the Danish work ethic. The Swedish economist
Martin Ljunge has found that Sweden’s generous sick leave insurance system has
gradually increased the population’s desire to stay home from work, with
younger Swedes 20 percent more likely to take sick days than their older
counterparts, other circumstances being equal. Ljunge claims that “the higher
demand for sick leave pay among the younger generations can be seen as a measure
of how rapidly the welfare state affects attitudes toward the use of public
benefits.” In the paper “Family Welfare Cultures,” the economists Gordon B.
Dahl, Andreas Ravndal Kostol, and Magne Mogstad study the Norwegian disability
insurance system, in which the benefits that claimants are granted often depend
on the strictness of the judge who hears their case. The authors find that when
a parent is granted disability insurance by a lenient judge, his or her adult
children are significantly more likely to claim disability benefits in the
future, with the effect increasing over time. So the lesson from Nordic
countries is not that large welfare systems can be introduced without harming
economic growth or creating a culture of welfare dependency—the lesson is that
they will do precisely that.



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