The Planning Machine
The
Planning Machine
By: Evgeny
Morozov
Taken from:
The New Yorker
In June,
1972, Ángel Parra, Chile’s leading folksinger, wrote a song titled “Litany for
a Computer and a Baby About to Be Born.” Computers are like children, he sang,
and Chilean bureaucrats must not abandon them. The song was prompted by a visit
to Santiago from a British consultant who, with his ample beard and burly
physique, reminded Parra of Santa Claus—a Santa bearing a “hidden gift,
cybernetics.”
The
consultant, Stafford Beer, had been brought in by Chile’s top planners to help
guide the country down what Salvador Allende, its democratically elected
Marxist leader, was calling “the Chilean road to socialism.” Beer was a leading
theorist of cybernetics—a discipline born of midcentury efforts to understand
the role of communication in controlling social, biological, and technical
systems. Chile’s government had a lot to control: Allende, who took office in
November of 1970, had swiftly nationalized the country’s key industries, and he
promised “worker participation” in the planning process. Beer’s mission was to
deliver a hypermodern information system that would make this possible, and so
bring socialism into the computer age. The system he devised had a gleaming,
sci-fi name: Project Cybersyn.
Beer was an
unlikely savior for socialism. He had served as an executive with United Steel
and worked as a development director for the International Publishing
Corporation (then one of the largest media companies in the world), and he ran
a lucrative consulting practice. He had a lavish life style, complete with a
Rolls-Royce and a grand house in Surrey, which was fitted out with a
remote-controlled waterfall in the dining room and a glass mosaic with a
pattern based on the Fibonacci series. To convince workers that cybernetics in
the service of the command economy could offer the best of socialism, a certain
amount of reassurance was in order. In addition to folk music, there were plans
for cybernetic-themed murals in the factories, and for instructional cartoons
and movies. Mistrust remained. “chile run by computer,” a January, 1973,
headline in the Observer announced, shaping the reception of Beer’s plan in
Britain.
At the
center of Project Cybersyn (for “cybernetics synergy”) was the Operations Room,
where cybernetically sound decisions about the economy were to be made. Those
seated in the op room would review critical highlights—helpfully summarized
with up and down arrows—from a real-time feed of factory data from around the
country. The prototype op room was built in downtown Santiago, in the interior
courtyard of a building occupied by the national telecom company. It was a
hexagonal space, thirty-three feet in diameter, accommodating seven white
fibreglass swivel chairs with orange cushions and, on the walls, futuristic
screens. Tables and paper were banned. Beer was building the future, and it had
to look like the future.
That was a
challenge: the Chilean government was running low on cash and supplies; the
United States, dismayed by Allende’s nationalization campaign, was doing its
best to cut Chile off. And so a certain amount of improvisation was necessary.
Four screens could show hundreds of pictures and figures at the touch of a
button, delivering historical and statistical information about production—the
Datafeed—but the screen displays had to be drawn (and redrawn) by hand, a job
performed by four young female graphic designers. Given Beer’s plans to build
an entire “factory to turn out operations rooms”—every state-run industrial
concern was to have one—Project Cybersyn could at least provide graphic
designers with full employment.
Beer, who
was fond of cigars and whiskey, made sure that an ashtray and a small holder
for a glass were built into one of the armrests for each chair. (Sometimes, it
seemed, the task of managing the economy went better with a buzz on.) The other
armrest featured rows of buttons for navigating the screens. In addition to the
Datafeed, there was a screen that simulated the future state of the Chilean
economy under various conditions. Before you set prices, established production
quotas, or shifted petroleum allocations, you could see how your decision would
play out.
One wall
was reserved for Project Cyberfolk, an ambitious effort to track the real-time
happiness of the entire Chilean nation in response to decisions made in the op
room. Beer built a device that would enable the country’s citizens, from their
living rooms, to move a pointer on a voltmeter-like dial that indicated moods
ranging from extreme unhappiness to complete bliss. The plan was to connect
these devices to a network—it would ride on the existing TV networks—so that
the total national happiness at any moment in time could be determined. The
algedonic meter, as the device was called (from the Greek algos, “pain,” and
hedone, “pleasure”), would measure only raw pleasure-or-pain reactions to show
whether government policies were working.
Project
Cybersyn can also be viewed as a dispatch from the future. These days, business
publications and technology conferences endlessly celebrate real-time dynamic
planning, the widespread deployment of tiny but powerful sensors, and, above
all, Big Data—an infinitely elastic concept that, according to some inexorable
but yet unnamed law of technological progress, packs twice as much ambiguity in
the same two words as it did the year before. In many respects, Beer’s
cybernetic dream has finally come true: the virtue of collecting and analyzing
information in real time is an article of faith shared by corporations and governments
alike.
Beer was
invited to Chile by a twenty-eight-year-old technocrat named Fernando Flores,
whom Allende had appointed to the state development agency. The agency, a
stronghold of Chilean technocracy, was given the task of administering the
newly nationalized enterprises. Flores was undeterred by Beer’s lack of
socialist credentials. He saw that there was a larger intellectual affinity
between socialism and cybernetics; in fact, both East Germany and the Soviet
Union considered, though never actually built, projects similar to Cybersyn.
As Eden
Medina shows in “Cybernetic Revolutionaries,” her entertaining history of
Project Cybersyn, Beer set out to solve an acute dilemma that Allende faced.
How was he to nationalize hundreds of companies, reorient their production
toward social needs, and replace the price system with central planning, all
while fostering the worker participation that he had promised? Beer realized
that the planning problems of business managers—how much inventory to hold,
what production targets to adopt, how to redeploy idle equipment—were similar
to those of central planners. Computers that merely enabled factory automation
were of little use; what Beer called the “cussedness of things” required human
involvement. It’s here that computers could help—flagging problems in need of
immediate attention, say, or helping to simulate the long-term consequences of
each decision. By analyzing troves of enterprise data, computers could warn
managers of any “incipient instability.” In short, management cybernetics would
allow for the reëngineering of socialism—the command-line economy.
To take
advantage of automated computer analysis, managers would need to get a clear
view of daily life inside their own firm. First, they would have to locate
critical bottlenecks. They needed to know that if trucks arrived late at Plant
A, then Plant B wouldn’t finish the product by its deadline. Why would the
trucks be late? Well, the drivers might be on strike, or lousy weather might
have closed the roads. Workers, not managers, would have the most intimate
knowledge of these things.
When Beer
was a steel-industry executive, he would assemble experts—anthropologists,
biologists, logicians—and dispatch them to extract such tacit knowledge from
the shop floor. The goal was to produce a list of relevant indicators (like
total gasoline reserves or delivery delays) that could be monitored so that
managers would be able to head off problems early. In Chile, Beer intended to
replicate the modelling process: officials would draw up the list of key production
indicators after consulting with workers and managers. “The on-line control
computer ought to be sensorily coupled to events in real time,” Beer argued in
a 1964 lecture that presaged the arrival of smart, net-connected devices—the
so-called Internet of Things. Given early notice, the workers could probably
solve most of their own problems. Everyone would gain from computers: workers
would enjoy more autonomy while managers would find the time for long-term
planning. For Allende, this was good socialism. For Beer, this was good
cybernetics.
Cybernetics
was born in the mid-nineteen-forties, as scholars in various disciplines began
noticing that social, natural, and mechanical systems exhibit similar patterns
of self-regulation. Norbert Wiener’s classic “Cybernetics; or, Control and
Communication in the Animal and the Machine” (1948) discussed human behavior by
drawing on his close observation of technologies like the radar and the
thermostat. The latter is remarkable for how little it needs to know in order
to do its job. It doesn’t care whether what’s making the room so hot is your
brand-new plasma TV or the weather outside. It just needs to compare its actual
output (the temperature right now) with its predefined output (the desired
temperature) and readjust its input (whatever mechanism is producing heat or
cold).
Wiener held
that a patient suffering from purpose tremor—spilling a glass of water before
raising it to his lips—was akin to a malfunctioning thermostat. Both rely on
“negative feedback”—“negative” because it tends to oppose what the system is
doing. In a way, our bodies are feedback machines: we maintain our body
temperature without a specially programmed response for “condition: bathhouse”
or “condition: tundra.” The tendency to self-adjust is known as homeostasis,
and it’s ubiquitous in both the natural and the mechanical worlds. For Beer, in
fact, corporations are homeostats. They have a clear goal—survival—and are full
of feedback loops: between the company and its suppliers or between workers and
management. And if we can make homeostatic corporations why not homeostatic
governments?
Yet central
planning had been powerfully criticized for being unresponsive to shifting
realities, notably by the free-market champion Friedrich Hayek. The efforts of
socialist planners, he argued, were bound to fail, because they could not do
what the free market’s price system could: aggregate the poorly codified
knowledge that implicitly guides the behavior of market participants. Beer and
Hayek knew each other; as Beer noted in his diary, Hayek even complimented him
on his vision for the cybernetic factory, after Beer presented it at a 1960
conference in Illinois. (Hayek, too, ended up in Chile, advising Augusto
Pinochet.) But they never agreed about planning. Beer believed that technology
could help integrate workers’ informal knowledge into the national planning
process while lessening information overload.
Project
Cybersyn, to be sure, lacked the gizmos available to contemporary
organizations. When Beer landed in Santiago, he had access only to two
mainframe computers, which the government badly needed for other tasks. Beer
chose the “cloud” model: one central computer, analyzing reports sent by telex
machines installed at state-run factories, could inform the firm of emerging
problems and, if nothing was done, alert agency officials.
But
computer analysis of factories was only as good as the underlying formal model
of how they actually work. Hermann Schwember, a senior member of Cybersyn,
described the process in a 1977 essay. The modelling team dispatched to a
canning plant, for example, would start with a list of technical questions.
What supplies—tin cans, sugar, fruit—were critical to its over-all activity?
Were there statistics—say, the amount of peeled fruit, the number of cans in
the factory line—that offered an accurate snapshot of the state of production?
Were there any machines that might automatically provide the indicators sought
by the team (the counter of the sealing unit, perhaps)? The answers would yield
a flowchart that started with suppliers and ended with customers.
Suppose
that the state planners wanted the plant to expand its cooking capacity by
twenty per cent. The modelling would determine whether the target was
plausible. Say the existing boiler was used at ninety per cent of capacity, and
increasing the amount of canned fruit would mean exceeding that capacity by
fifty per cent. With these figures, you could generate a statistical profile
for the boiler you’d need. Unrealistic production goals, overused resources,
and unwise investment decisions could be dealt with quickly. “It is perfectly
possible . . . to capture data at source in real time, and to process them
instantly,” Beer later noted. “But we do not have the machinery for such
instant data capture, nor do we have the sophisticated computer programs that
would know what to do with such a plethora of information if we had it.”
[cartoon id="a18529"]
Today,
sensor-equipped boilers and tin cans report their data automatically, and in
real time. And, just as Beer thought, data about our past behaviors can yield
useful predictions. Amazon recently obtained a patent for “anticipatory
shipping”—a technology for shipping products before orders have even been
placed. Walmart has long known that sales of strawberry Pop-Tarts tend to skyrocket
before hurricanes; in the spirit of computer-aided homeostasis, the company
knows that it’s better to restock its shelves than to ask why.
Governments,
with oceans of information at their disposal, are following suit. That’s
evident from an essay on the “data-driven city,” by Michael Flowers, the former
chief analytics officer of New York City, which appears in “Beyond
Transparency: Open Data and the Future of Civic Innovation,” a recent
collection of essays (published, tellingly, by the Code for America Press),
edited by Brett Goldstein with Lauren Dyson. Flowers suggests that real-time
data analysis is allowing city agencies to operate in a cybernetic manner.
Consider the allocation of building inspectors in a city like New York. If the
city authorities know which buildings have caught fire in the past and if they
have a deep profile for each such building—if, for example, they know that such
buildings usually feature illegal conversions, and their owners are behind on
paying property taxes or have a history of mortgage foreclosures—they can
predict which buildings are likely to catch fire in the future and decide where
inspectors should go first. The appeal of this approach to bureaucrats is
fairly obvious: like Beer’s central planners, they can be effective while
remaining ignorant of the causal mechanisms at play. “I am not interested in
causation except as it speaks to action,” Flowers told Kenneth Cukier and
Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, the authors of “Big Data” (Houghton Mifflin), another
recent book on the subject. “Causation is for other people, and frankly it is
very dicey when you start talking about causation. . . . You know, we have real
problems to solve.”
In another
contribution to “Beyond Transparency,” the technology publisher and investor
Tim O’Reilly, one of Silicon Valley’s in-house intellectuals, celebrates a new
mode of governance that he calls “algorithmic regulation.” The aim is to
replace rigid rules issued by out-of-touch politicians with fluid and
personalized feedback loops generated by gadget-wielding customers. Reputation
becomes the new regulation: why pass laws banning taxi-drivers from dumping
sandwich wrappers on the back seat if the market can quickly punish such
behavior with a one-star rating? It’s a far cry from Beer’s socialist utopia,
but it relies on the same cybernetic principle: collect as much relevant data
from as many sources as possible, analyze them in real time, and make an
optimal decision based on the current circumstances rather than on some
idealized projection. All that’s needed is a set of fibreglass swivel chairs.
Chilean
politics, as it happened, was anything but homeostatic. Cybernetic synergy was
a safe subject for the relatively calm first year of Allende’s rule: the
economy was growing, social programs were expanding, real wages were improving.
But the calm didn’t last. Allende, frustrated by the intransigence of his
parliamentary opposition, began to rule by executive decree, prompting the
opposition to question the constitutionality of his actions. Workers, too,
began to cause trouble, demanding wage increases that the government couldn’t
deliver. Washington, concerned that the Chilean road to socialism might have
already been found, was also meddling in the country’s politics, trying to
thwart some of the announced reforms.
In October,
1972, a nationwide strike by truck drivers, who were fearful of
nationalization, threatened to paralyze the country. Fernando Flores had the
idea of deploying Cybersyn’s telex machines to outmaneuver the strikers, encouraging
industries to coördinate the sharing of fuel. Most workers declined to back the
strike and sided with Allende, who also invited the military to join the
cabinet. Flores was appointed Minister of Economics, the strike petered out,
and it seemed that Project Cybersyn would win the day.
On December
30, 1972, Allende visited the Operations Room, sat in one of the swivel chairs,
and pushed a button or two. It was hot, and the buttons didn’t show the right
slides. Undaunted, the President told the team to keep working. And they did,
readying the system for its official launch, in February, 1973. By then,
however, long-term planning was becoming something of a luxury. One of
Cybersyn’s directors remarked at the time that “every day more people wanted to
work on the project,” but, for all this manpower, the system still failed to
work in a timely manner. In one instance, a cement-factory manager discovered
that an impending coal shortage might halt production at his enterprise, so he
travelled to the coal mine to solve the problem in person. Several days later,
a notice from Project Cybersyn arrived to warn him of a potential coal
shortage—a problem that he had already tackled. With such delays, factories
didn’t have much incentive to report their data.
One of the
participating engineers described the factory modelling process as “fairly
technocratic” and “top down”—it did not involve “speaking to the guy who was
actually working on the mill or the spinning machine.” Frustrated with the
growing bureaucratization of Project Cybersyn, Beer considered resigning. “If
we wanted a new system of government, then it seems that we are not going to
get it,” he wrote to his Chilean colleagues that spring. “The team is falling
apart, and descending to personal recrimination.” Confined to the language of
cybernetics, Beer didn’t know what to do. “I can see no way of practical change
that does not very quickly damage the Chilean bureaucracy beyond repair,” he
wrote.
It was
Allende’s regime itself that was soon damaged beyond repair. Pinochet had no
need for real-time centralized planning; the market was to replace it. When
Allende’s regime was overthrown, on September 11, 1973, Project Cybersyn met
its end as well. Beer happened to be out of the country, but others weren’t so
lucky. Allende ended up dead, Flores in prison, other Cybersyn managers in
hiding. The Operations Room didn’t survive, either. In a fit of what we might
now call PowerPoint rage, a member of the Chilean military stabbed its slides
with a knife.
Today, one
is as likely to hear about Project Cybersyn’s aesthetics as about its politics.
The resemblance that the Operations Room—with its all-white, utilitarian
surfaces and oversized buttons—bears to the Apple aesthetic is not entirely
accidental. The room was designed by Gui Bonsiepe, an innovative German
designer who studied and taught at the famed Ulm School of Design, in Germany,
and industrial design associated with the Ulm School inspired Steve Jobs and
the Apple designer Jonathan Ive.
But
Cybersyn anticipated more than tech’s form factors. It’s suggestive that
Nest—the much admired smart thermostat, which senses whether you’re home and
lets you adjust temperatures remotely—now belongs to Google, not Apple. Created
by engineers who once worked on the iPod, it has a slick design, but most of
its functionality (like its ability to learn and adjust to your favorite
temperature by observing your behavior) comes from analyzing data, Google’s
bread and butter. The proliferation of sensors with Internet connectivity
provides a homeostatic solution to countless predicaments. Google Now, the
popular smartphone app, can perpetually monitor us and (like Big Mother, rather
than like Big Brother) nudge us to do the right thing—exercise, say, or take
the umbrella.
Companies
like Uber, meanwhile, insure that the market reaches a homeostatic equilibrium
by monitoring supply and demand for transportation. Google recently acquired
the manufacturer of a high-tech spoon—the rare gadget that is both smart and
useful—to compensate for the purpose tremors that captivated Norbert Wiener.
(There is also a smart fork that vibrates when you are eating too fast; “smart”
is no guarantee against “dumb.”) The ubiquity of sensors in our cities can
shift behavior: a new smart parking system in Madrid charges different rates
depending on the year and the make of the car, punishing drivers of old,
pollution-prone models. Helsinki’s transportation board has released an
Uber-like app, which, instead of dispatching an individual car, coördinates
multiple requests for nearby destinations, pools passengers, and allows them to
share a much cheaper ride on a minibus.
Such
experiments, however, would be impossible without access to the underlying
data, and companies like Uber typically want to grab and hold as much data as
they can. When, in 1975, Beer argued that “information is a national resource,”
he was ahead of his time in treating the question of ownership—just who gets to
own the means of data production, not to mention the data?—as a political issue
that cannot be reduced to its technological dimensions.
Uber says
that it can monitor its supply-and-demand curves in real time. Instead of
sticking to fixed rates for car rides, it can charge a floating rate depending
on market conditions when an order is placed. As Uber’s C.E.O. told Wired last
December, “We are not setting the price. The market is setting the price. We
have algorithms to determine what that market is.” It’s a marvellous case study
in Cybersyn capitalism. And it explains why Uber’s prices tend to skyrocket in
inclement weather. (The company recently agreed to cap these hikes in American
cities during emergencies.) Uber maintains that surge pricing allows it to get
more drivers onto the road in dismal weather conditions. This claim would be
stronger if there were a way to confirm its truth by reviewing the data. But at
Uber, as at so many tech companies, what happens in the op room stays in the op
room.
Stafford
Beer was deeply shaken by the 1973 coup, and dedicated his immediate
post-Cybersyn life to helping his exiled Chilean colleagues. He separated from
his wife, sold the fancy house in Surrey, and retired to a secluded cottage in
rural Wales, with no running water and, for a long time, no phone line. He let
his once carefully trimmed beard grow to Tolstoyan proportions. A Chilean
scientist later claimed that Beer came to Chile a businessman and left a
hippie. He gained a passionate following in some surprising circles. In
November, 1975, Brian Eno struck up a correspondence with him. Eno got Beer’s
books into the hands of his fellow-musicians David Byrne and David Bowie; Bowie
put Beer’s “Brain of the Firm” on a list of his favorite books.
Isolated in
his cottage, Beer did yoga, painted, wrote poetry, and, occasionally, consulted
for clients like Warburtons, a popular British bakery. Management cybernetics
flourished nonetheless: Malik, a respected consulting firm in Switzerland, has
been applying Beer’s ideas for decades. In his later years, Beer tried to
re-create Cybersyn in other countries—Uruguay, Venezuela, Canada—but was
invariably foiled by local bureaucrats. In 1980, he wrote to Robert Mugabe, of
Zimbabwe, to gauge his interest in creating “a national information network
(operating with decentralized nodes using cheap microcomputers) to make the
country more governable in every modality.” Mugabe, apparently, had no use for
algedonic meters.
Fernando
Flores moved in the opposite direction. In 1976, an Amnesty International
campaign secured his release from prison, and he ended up in California, at
Berkeley, studying the ideas of Martin Heidegger and J. L. Austin and writing a
doctoral thesis on business communications in the office of the future. In
California, Flores reinvented himself as a business consultant and a technology
entrepreneur. (In the early nineteen-eighties, Werner Erhard, the founder of
est, was among his backers.) Flores reëntered Chilean politics and was elected
a senator in 2001. Toying with the idea of running for President, he eventually
launched his own party and found common ground with the right.
Before
designing Project Cybersyn, Beer used to complain that technology “seems to be
leading humanity by the nose.” After his experience in Chile, he decided that
something else was to blame. If Silicon Valley, rather than Santiago, has
proved to be the capital of management cybernetics, Beer wasn’t wrong to think
that Big Data and distributed sensors could be enlisted for a very different
social mission. While cybernetic feedback loops do allow us to use scarce
resources more effectively, the easy availability of fancy thermostats
shouldn’t prevent us from asking if the walls of our houses are too flimsy or
if the windows are broken. A bit of causal thinking can go a long way. For all
its utopianism and scientism, its algedonic meters and hand-drawn graphs,
Project Cybersyn got some aspects of its politics right: it started with the
needs of the citizens and went from there. The problem with today’s digital
utopianism is that it typically starts with a PowerPoint slide in a venture
capitalist’s pitch deck. As citizens in an era of Datafeed, we still haven’t
figured out how to manage our way to happiness. But there’s a lot of money to
be made in selling us the dials.
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